The Mumbai Deluge:
Crisis in Urban Governance

Prepared by Sudha Rajagopalan, Ph.D.

On July 26, 2005, Bombay, a city used to heavy monsoons, was caught unawares by the highest rainfall of the century. The metropolis received 37.1 inches or 94.4 centimeters of rain in a 24-hour period between July 26 and 27, higher than the annual average. As the death toll across the city rose and the country’s financial capital ground to a halt, a furious civic debate began to address Mumbai’s urban challenges.

This Chaitanya guide considers the Mumbai debate and branches out to an overview of problems facing other metropolises in the region and recommendations for these cities’ renewal.

• Crisis in Urban South Asia
• Improving Urban Governance in South Asia

As usual we begin by asking the 'what' questions

What happened?

Why?

As always, we invite you to send in links that you consider helpful and relevant.

What happened?

map source: www.explocity.com

Mumbai gets heavy rains every monsoon, but this time was different; the city that otherwise never stops ground to an almost complete halt. The death toll was high in Mumbai which saw 435 known casualties. Nearby towns of Thane, Raigad and Navi Mumbai recorded casualties approximating 169, 145 and 61. To understand the issues that were raised in the debate about the deluge, this guide provides links to coverage of the rains and the flooding in the city.

When the rains deluged the west coast of India around and in the city of Mumbai, public transport in this city ceased to function. Bombayites were stranded at work or waded back home, their long return journey sometimes taking up to 10 hours. The more pragmatic ones spent as many as two nights at their work place, before they could return to their water-clogged residential areas. All telephone lines were immediately non-operational and those stranded often could not contact anxious families and friends with the now ubiquitous cell-phone. In Mumbai, all schools, unversities, banks and firms shut down. 55 Suburban trains, more than 35000 rickshaws and approximately 10,000 commercial vehicles suffered damage.

The worst affected areas were north of the city’s historic centre. The newly reclaimed area from Kalina up to Saki Naka saw the worst floods. A section of a chawl or shanty structure on the edge of a hill in Saki Naka collapsed during a landslide caused by the rain, causing the death of approximately 100 residents.

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Why?

The national debate that has followed the Bombay flooding, comprising media articles and eye-witness accounts, has addressed the factors that caused the floods and casualties in the city. City officials were quick to state (absolving themselves of responsibility) that the rains were unprecedented and thus the city could not have possibly known how to cope. Yet it was patently obvious that the inadequacy of the city’s infrastructure was to blame for the extent of the clogging and the number of casualties. The reasons that have been proferred for the crisis suggest a lack of planned development to keep pace with rapid urbanization, specifically with regard to construction projects, housing and drainage.

The lack of long-term thinking in governance and planning public infrastructure projects, and random reclamations for that purpose, have been cited as a factor reducing Bombay’s capacity to bear the rains.

Tavleen Singh. Minimum Planning for a rainy day. Indian Express, August 7, 2005.

Chandrashekhar Prabhu, Why Mumbai choked? Frontline, Volume 22 - Issue 17, Aug 13 - 26, 2005.

Mumbai’s looming ecological disaster, BBC News, August 2 2005.

Dilip D'Souza, It says about a city, India Together, August 12 2005.

The lack of a warning and disaster relief system, poor infrastructure and the proliferation of slums in flood-prone areas are an important reason why the city failed to cope with the rains.

Rahul Wadke, Whither Mumbai? Hindu Business Line, August 12, 2005.

The absence of an extensive sewage network in the northern areas of the city caused excessive flooding in those areas. Interestingly, South Bombay remained unaffected and many residents of this area had no idea what had happened in the northern suburbs until they watched the news that night.

Kavitha Iyer, Mumbai drowns in own filth: only 40% have sewer access, Indian Express, August 8, 2005. See also, Indian Express, Mumbai Reclaimed.

Shishir Gupta, The 944-mm damage: Mumbai has Rs 1200-cr drainage plan, Indian Express, August 14, 2005.

An outdated infrastructure and a lack of civic engagement have also been cited as a serious cause of the extent of devastation after the floods.

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Post-script: Mumbai Deluge and Hurricane Katrina

Siddharth Srivastava, Hurricane Katrina and the Mumbai Floods, Berkeley Daily Planet, September 9, 2005.

Dr Kirsten Zickfeld, Mumbai to Katrina: Blame it on yourself? The Rediff Interview, September 6, 2005.

South Asia: Responding to Hurricane Katrina, Global Voices Online, September 7, 2005. (Blogged responses to the hurricane disaster.)

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